The Commonwealth’s 2016 Budget Wine Tax Rebate Proposals

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Abstract

Australia’s significant wine equalization tax (WET) and the WET rebate policies are out of step with our competitors’ low touch wine taxation regimes, and these policies have been subject to significant criticism. This article critiques the 2016 Budget WET rebate reform proposals which only partially address the multifaceted wine tax issues. Given the different views on Australian wine taxation there is a need to assess the case for the WET rebate having regard to the generally accepted four tax policy criteria. There is no known such analysis of the WET rebate. A partial policy analysis is undertaken to critique the WET rebate proposals. The WET rebate analysis is undertaken from the perspective of four well-accepted tax policy criteria: Fiscal adequacy, economic efficiency, equity, and simplicity. The WET rebate cannot be justified. The budget proposals to reduce the WET rebate and restrict eligibility are a step in the right direction toward a better policy outcome. Reducing the value of the impact of the WET rebate will have a slightly negative economic impact on some wine regions but the proposed assistance will help the industry to adjust. Research into value of the positive impact of the WET rebate on regional Australia is needed to assess: The additional consumer surplus generated by additional wine consumption choices, the value of tourism, and economic impact on regional economies.

Keywords: Wine Equalization Tax; Wine Equalization Tax Rebate; Tax Policy; Wine Tax; 2016 Commonwealth Budget

1. Introduction

The Australian wine industry operates in a very dynamic and competitive market. Since 2007, this industry has significantly contracted with the value of domestic wine sales remaining static and exports falling. Australia’s exports fell by 38% between 2007 and 2012, Centauras Partners Report (2013). New competitors from New Zealand, Chile, Argentina, and South Africa have taken hold and traditional wine countries have become more competitive, Centauras Partners Report (2013).

Furthermore, people are now consuming more premium wines, Cembalo et al. (2014). Australia’s significant wine equalization tax (WET) and the WET rebate policies are out of step with our competitors’ zero or low wine taxation regimes, Anderson (2010). These policies have been subject to significant criticism, Anderson (2010), Fogarty and Jakeman (2011); Barton and Pinto (2014); Kenny (2012); Treasury (Cth), “Re: Think” Tax discussion paper; Senate Rural And Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Report Australian grape and wine industry (2016). This article critiques the 2016 Budget WET rebate reform proposals which only partially address the multifaceted wine tax issues.

A rebate of WET applies for producers of rebatable wine that are registered or required to be registered for GST in Australia.1 The WET commenced on 1 July 2000 and was designed to replace the

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former wholesale sales tax\(^2\) on wine.\(^3\) The WET imposes a wine tax on the taxable value of assessable dealings\(^4\) with wine\(^5\) in Australia.\(^6\) The tax is applied to both Australian produced wine and imported wine. The primary types of assessable dealings are wholesale sales;\(^7\) retail sales;\(^8\) application of wine for own use;\(^9\) and certain importations.\(^10\) Some assessable dealings such as exports are exempt.\(^11\) WET is calculated at the rate of 29%\(^12\) of the taxable value of assessable dealings with wine in Australia.\(^13\) The WET is calculated on the selling price of the wine excluding wine tax and GST.

Imported wine into Australia has increased in recent years with NZ exploiting the WET rebate and accounting for much of this growth (providing 64% of wine imports in 2014).\(^14\) WET is paid by the importer unless an ABN is quoted for wine undergoing further processing - distribution. A wine tariff of 5% also applies to imports unless a free-trade agreement provides an exemption, as it does with New Zealand.\(^15\)

The WET rebate was designed to allow a majority of wine producers would be able to fully offset their WET liability by accessing the WET rebate and help small wine producers in rural and regional Australia to reduce or offset entirely their WET liability.\(^16\) The maximum amount of rebate an Australian producer, or group of associated producers,\(^17\) could claim in a full financial year is

\(^2\) Former the Sales Tax Assessment Act 1992 (C\(^{\text{th}}\)) (STAA); Sales Tax (Exemptions and Classifications) Act 1992; Sales Tax Imposition (Excise) Act 1992 (C\(^{\text{th}}\)), Sales Tax Imposition (Customs) Act 1992, the Sales Tax Imposition (General) Act 1992 and the Sales Tax Imposition (In Situ Pools) Act 1992. The former wholesale sales tax was abolished on 30 June 2000 with the introduction of the GST and the WET.

\(^3\) Prior to the WET the last wholesale sale of wine was subject to sales tax at the rate of 41%. Given the GST rate of only 10% wine prices would have dropped severely.

\(^4\) WETA 1999 s 5-5. Assessable dealings include selling wine, using wine, or making a local entry of imported wine at the customs barrier.

\(^5\) WETA 1999 ss 31-1, 31-2, 31-3, 31-4, 31-5, 31-6 and 31-7. Wine is defined to include alcoholic products that contain more than 1.15% by volume of ethyl alcohol that are grape wine; grape wine products (such as marsala, vermouth, wine cocktails and creams); fruit wines or vegetable wines; and cider, Perry, mead and sake.

\(^6\) WETA 1999 s 5-5.

\(^7\) WETA 1999 s 33-1: “A wholesale sale means a sale to an entity that purchases for the purpose of resale, but does not include a sale of wine from stock in a retail store (or retail section of a store) to make up for a temporary shortage of stock of the purchaser, if the wine is of a kind that: (a) Is usually *manufactured by the purchaser; or (b) is usually purchased by the purchaser for resale.” The most common assessable dealing involves the sale of wine by a winery to a retailer, or a sale of wine by a distributor to a retailer.

\(^8\) WETA 1999 s 33-1. “A retail sale is a sale that is not a wholesale sale.” This commonly is a sale made to a person who does not purchase the wine for the purpose of resale. For example, a sale at the cellar door of a winery.

\(^9\) Australian Taxation Office (ATO) Wine Equalisation Tax Ruling WETR 2004/1 at para 33. This usually involves: “wine used for cellar door tastings; wine used for tastings at exhibitions; wine used for wine shows; wine used for promotions; wine donated to charity; wine given to retailers, restaurants and so on, as samples; wine given to staff; and wine taken for personal consumption.”

\(^10\) Such as the entry of imported wine for home consumption.

\(^11\) WETA 1999 s 7-5.


\(^13\) WETA 1999 s 5-5.

\(^14\) No tariff applies to wine produced in the United States, New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, Japan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Pacific Island Forum countries, developing countries and least developed countries.

\(^15\) Tax Laws Amendment (Wine Producer Rebate and Other Measures) Bill 2004: Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 1.7. See also Treasurer Peter Costello MP press release, Wine Industry Assistance, 11 March 1996.

\(^16\) WETA 1999 s 19-20.
AU$500,000 from 1 July 2006. \(^{18}\) This is equivalent to about AU$1.7 million wholesale value of eligible sales and applications to own use per annum. To claim a rebate an entity must also be liable to pay WET on the wine or would have been liable to pay WET on the wine had the purchaser of the wine not quoted for the sale of the wine. \(^{19}\) Producer is defined widely to include entities registered for GST that has manufactured wine; or provided their produce to a contract wine maker to make wine on their behalf or have subjected purchased wine to a process of wine manufacture. \(^{20}\)

The Treasury Re: Think’ Tax discussion paper (2015) note the numerous entities that can access the rebate as follows: Grape growers who undertake manufacture themselves (that is, crush grapes and ferment the juice); grape growers who have the grapes processed into wine on their behalf; winemakers who purchase grapes and manufacture the wine; blenders and entities undertaking other further manufacturing processes; and contract winemakers (in some cases). Furthermore, “virtual winemakers” who have no involvement in the winemaking process (they do not own or lease vineyards, have no plant or equipment or a cellar door) claim the rebate. These virtual producers acquire grapes and/or wine and contract out the manufacturing or blending process to claim the WET rebate; producers of branded wine where the producer owns the brand; producers of branded wine where the wholesaler or retailer owns the brand; producers of bulk and unbranded wine; and non-resident producers - producers that are based overseas but undertake winemaking in Australia, Treasury Re: Think’ Tax discussion paper (2015).

Although New Zealand does not impose a WET, the Australian WET producer rebate was extended to eligible New Zealand wine producers that have their wine exported to Australia from 1 July 2005. \(^{21}\) The maximum amount of rebate a New Zealand producer, or group of associated producers, can claim in a full financial year is the same as Australian producers. \(^{22}\) Other new wine and traditional wine countries cannot access the WET producer rebate. To obtain the rebate, a New Zealand winemaker must produce wine in New Zealand that is exported to Australia; and substantiate that WET was paid in Australia on the sale of the wine. \(^{23}\) While the wine must be ultimately sold in Australia, a New Zealand producer does not have to sell the wine in Australia since a wholesaler or distributor can make the sale in Australia. In line with rising exports to Australia, the New Zealand rebate has grown quickly from AU$5 million in 2006-2007 to AU$25 million 2013-2014. The Australian National Audit Office (2011) also noted the increase arose from an increased incidence of New Zealand grape growers accessing the New Zealand rebate using contract winemakers’ facilities to enable them to register as wine producers.

Unfortunately, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) data does not distinguish between WET rebate and other refunds, and thus does not allow a proper analysis of who gets the rebate, Centaurus Partners (2013). This is a major problem for a rebate designed to assist small wine producers in rural and regional Australia.

2. Literature Review

The arguments for and against indirect wine taxation such as the WET are generally grounded on economic efficiency and the views are mixed. It is argued that higher taxes on wine are justified since they focus on the high external costs associated with alcohol consumption. External costs include direct costs of abusive drinkers’ car accidents, property damage and violence, Smith (2005) and indirect

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\(^{18}\) WETA 1999 s 19-15. Previously, from 1 October 2004 to 30 June 2006, the maximum amount of rebate was AS$290,000, i.e., exempting AU$1 million (wholesale value) of sales per annum.

\(^{19}\) ATO Wine Equalisation Tax Ruling, WETR 2009/2, Wine equalisation tax: Operation of the producer rebate for other than New Zealand participants, ATO, Canberra, 6.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) WETA 1999 s 19-5(2). New Zealand wine producers may apply to the Australian Commissioner of Taxation to become approved New Zealand participants.

\(^{22}\) WETA 1999 s 19-15.

costs of government-funded hospitals and health services for alcohol abuse, and other government expenditures such as police. Collins and Lapsley (2004) estimated that the tangible costs of alcohol in Australia, were high, being between 0.9% and 1.0% of GDP. Crime, health cost, and lost production amounted to AU$11 billion and further intangible costs associated with the loss of life and pain were estimated at AU$4.4 billion. The Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education submission (2015) estimates $9.3 billion per annum for tangible social costs from an individual’s alcohol misuse and $14 billion in tangible costs in harm to others.

It is also argued that wine has an inelastic demand; therefore, there are minimal distortions with taxes levied at a higher rate. Ramsey found that goods with inelastic demand should be taxed more heavily as such a tax minimizes consumption distortions. In addition, alcohol is seen as a complement to leisure and thus should be taxed at a higher rate. A UK study by Crawford et al. (2008) found utility is not weakly separable between consumption and leisure, and that changes in the relative price of goods do impact on labor. Therefore, complementary goods with leisure should be taxed at a relatively higher tax rate and that complementary goods with work should be taxed at a relatively lower tax rate. Further, it is argued that such taxes correct information failure. Young people may not be fully aware of the adverse health impacts of drinking alcohol, thus, it is argued that a supplementary tax or excise would raise the price of alcohol, and thus reduce consumption, World Health Organization (2007).

On the other hand, it is contended that wine should be taxed at the same rate as other goods to minimize economic distortions that impede the competitiveness of an important industry, Architecture of Australia’s Tax and Transfer (2008). Smith’s (2005) literature review concluded that alcohol demand is insufficiently price-inelastic to warrant higher than average taxation on the basis of the Ramsey inverse elasticity rule. There may also be adverse unintended consequences associated with wine taxation.

Externalities costs may be exaggerated. Crampton Burgess and Taylor (2011) dispute the Collins and Lapsley study. The authors estimated that in New Zealand, the actual net external annual cost of abusive alcohol consumption was a 96.9% reduction from a Business and Economic Research Limited study of costs. Single and Easton (2001) found externality cost estimates can have a broad range of error. Further, the consumption of wine is generally not abusive. Renaud and De Lorgeril (1992) found that France’s high consumption of fats but low incidence of heart disease may be explained by their high-wine consumption. Externalities should be addressed by corrective taxation that targets alcohol abusers, Architecture of Australia’s Tax and Transfer. Barton and Pinto (2014) called for the WET to be abolished since it only marginally aids tax revenue collection is inefficient and the complexity clearly fail the simplicity criteria. Kenny (2012) finds that the WET adds to complexity and fails to target the external costs associated with wine consumption.

Having regard to the WET rebate, numerous commentators note the serious equity problems with the rebate which has been subject to rorting, Treasury WET rebate discussion paper (2015); Murray Valley Winegrowers (2015); Australia’s Future Tax System (2009). Fogarty and Jakeman (2011) note the positive impact of the WET rebate on small wineries and regional tourism. Given the different views, there is a need to ground the case for the WET and WET rebate having regard to the tax policy criteria.

3. Tax Reviews

Numerous tax reviews have criticized the WET and WET rebate and have sought to replace this with a volumetric tax, as noted by the Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education Submission to the Tax White Paper Taskforce:

“Reviews that have recommended a volumetric tax be applied to wine include: The 1995 Committee of Inquiry into the Wine Grape and Wine Industry; 2003 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs Inquiry into Substance Abuse; the 2006 Victorian Inquiry Into Strategies to Reduce Harmful Alcohol Consumption; the 2009 Australia’s future tax system (Henry Review); the 2009 National Preventative Health Taskforce report on Preventing Alcohol-related Harms;
the 2010 Victorian Inquiry into Strategies to Reduce Assaults in Public Places; the 2011 WA Education and Health Standing Committee Inquiry into Alcohol; the 2012 Australian National Preventive Health Agency Exploring the public interest case for a minimum (floor) price for alcohol, draft report; and the 2012 Australian National Preventive Health Agency Exploring the public interest case for a minimum (floor) price for alcohol, final report.”

Recently, the Treasury Re: Think’ Tax discussion paper (2015) Tax White Paper reform process, released the paper “Better tax system better Australia” in March 2015. This paper briefly noted issues with wine taxes that offered favorable tax treatment, particularly for low-value wine and that influenced production and consumption decisions. Consequently, the Commonwealth Treasury WET rebate discussion paper (20150 aimed to better inform discussion and analysis of the WET rebate.

The Auditor General Report (2011) noted problems with the administration of the WET rebate. Tax schemes operated to improperly gain the rebate with wholesalers and retailers minimizing WET liability and maximizing WET rebate, Commonwealth Treasury WET rebate discussion paper (2015). Arrangements to maximize the rebate included: Bulk wine sales by grape growers to enable eligibility to growers; blending and further manufacture and the creation of interposed entities; restructuring contracts to inflate rebates; and virtual wine producers that acquire grapes or wine and contract out manufacture. Thus, the WET rebate may be distorting production patterns of wine by: Leading to oversupply of wine and wine grapes; preventing necessary industry adjustment; preventing market consolidation; and trapping businesses in the industry.

In addition, the wine industry has raised many issues about the WET rebate. The Treasury Re: Think’ Tax discussion paper (2015) found a number of ways the WET rebate could be reformed to ensure the sustainability of the wine industry: Abolishing the WET rebate; phase out the rebate with a grant to existing recipients; restrict eligibility for the WET rebate by excluding bulk, unpackaged, and unbranded wine; tightening the definition of “producer of wine;” demonstrating that WET has been paid on wine; reducing the maximum amount of the WET rebate; rebate less than the full amount of WET payable; replacing the WET rebate; and the Brewery Refund with a rebate scheme for all independent alcohol producers; and removing the New Zealand rebate. In September 2015, numerous industry and other submissions were received in response to the WET rebate discussion paper and these were published online.

There was considerable consensus for reforming the WET rebate. Most submissions called for the removal of bulk, unbranded wine and foreign producers from eligibility for the rebate Accolade Wines (2015); Riverland Wine (2015); Wine Tasmania (2015); Murray Valley Winegrowers (2015); Pernod; Treasury (2015); and Wine Grape Growers Australia (2015). Others submissions sought that the WET rebate be abolished: Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education (2015); Cancer Council (2015); Pernod Ricard Winemakers (2015); and Treasury Wine Estates (2015). Pernod Ricard Winemakers (2015) and Treasury Wine Estates (2015) noted that the removal of the rebate would allow a lower revenue neutral volumetric tax to be levied at $1.40 per liter, rather than $2.20 per liter if the rebate remained. The New Zealand government Submission to the Tax White Paper Taskforce (2015) stated that equal treatment of New Zealand producers was required under the Australia - New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, and that the WET rebate should be kept.

The Commonwealth government established the WET Rebate Consultative Group to examine the submissions and provide advice to the Government on options for reform. With the change of Prime Minister and Treasurer in November 2015, this process was rescheduled. In 2015-2016, the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee examined certain matters on the Australian grape and wine industry, including the impact and application of the WET rebate on grape and wine industry supply chains. The Senate’s Australian grape and wine industry report (2016) found that the WET rebate worked against the profitability of the wine industry and was subject to unlawful claims or rorting. The committee recommended that the WET rebate be phased out over 5 years, with the savings to assistance the industry and would include an annual grant to genuine cellar door operators to support their continued operation. Furthermore, the committee urged the Government to undertake a comprehensive reform of wine taxation.
4. 2016 Budget Proposals

In the 2016 Budget, the Commonwealth government announced that it would improve integrity of the WET rebate by reducing the WET rebate cap and tightening eligibility criteria, Budget Paper No. 2 (2016). The WET rebate cap will be reduced from $500,000 to $350,000 on 1 July 2017 and from 1 July 2018 to $290,000. Furthermore, more restrictive eligibility criteria will apply from 1 July 2019. This will better target assistance and reduce distortions in the wine industry and save $250 million of tax revenue over the forward estimates period 2017-2020. To benefit regional wine producing communities, the Australian Grape and Wine Authority will be provided with $50 million to promote wine tourism within Australia and Australian wine overseas.

5. Research Method

A partial policy analysis is undertaken to critique the 2016 Budget’s WET rebate proposals. Since the rebate is part of the WET system, this analysis reviews the WET as well as the WET rebate and is undertaken from the perspective of four well-accepted tax policy criteria: Fiscal adequacy, economic efficiency, equity, and simplicity. These criteria have been used by optimal tax theorists who seek to maximize social welfare, Alm (1996). An optimal tax balances these often conflicting tax policy objectives. Frey (2005) noted that optimal taxation theory indicates a preference for broadly based taxes that impose less distortions on the allocation of resources and provide better sources of tax revenue over narrowly based taxes. Optimal taxes have become prominent in tax reform processes. For example, in Australia, these four tax policy criteria were central to policy formulation in recent tax reform processes, the Review of Business Taxation (1999) and A Tax System Redesigned (2011).

5.1. Fiscal adequacy

Fiscal adequacy appears to be one of the primary reasons cited for specific alcohol taxes. Fiscal adequacy refers to the ability of taxation law to finance Government expenditure. Fiscal adequacy is a fundamental requirement for a tax system given the Government’s need for revenue to ensure good governance. For example, in respect of wine taxation, the Australian Government provided revenue rising as its rationale for significant increases in the wholesale sales tax on wine in 1993 and 1997.24 The WET, though, raises relatively small amounts of revenue, being 0.2% of total tax revenue of Commonwealth government tax revenue.25

The WET rebate damages fiscal adequacy with a significant and growing cost to revenue. In its first year, the WET rebate refunds amounted to $199 million in 2006-2007 and has increased each year, with $311 million refunded in 2013-14 (25% of WET), Commonwealth Final Budget Outcome (2014). Given this highly favorable rebate, the vast majority of small wine producers does not have to pay WET. Just 20 entities paid 89% of the WET that totaled $826 million in 2013-14 out of 3,880 entities paying WET, and in 2013-14, 1,967 entities claimed WET rebates and the number of entities claiming WET rebates has increased since its introduction, Commonwealth Final Budget Outcome (2014).

24 For example, in Australia, on 18 August 1993 the Commonwealth Government increased the tax on wine from the general wholesale sales tax rate (WST) of 20-31%. The rationale for this increase is clear given the name of the amending legislation: Sales Tax (General) (Deficit Reduction) Act 1993; Sales Tax (General) (Wine - Deficit Reduction) Act 1993. Also, on 6 August 1997 when the WST rate for wine 26-41% the Government provided revenue raising as its rationale. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Sales Tax Assessment Amendment Act 1997 stated:
In order to protect the future revenue of States and Territories, and in response to the unanimous request of the States and Territories, it is proposed that Commonwealth excises on petroleum and tobacco and sales tax on alcoholic beverages be increased to collect the revenue which would be lost by the States and Territories (As a result of constitutional invalidity of the state franchise fee on alcohol).

25 In 2013-14 the WET produced A$826 million of revenue and total tax revenue in 2013-14 was $ 433,885 million, Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014).
5.2. Economic efficiency

To efficiently allocate resources and permit industry to compete effectively the indirect tax system should be competitive. To minimize the efficiency costs, the indirect tax base should be broad, including all goods and services taxed at one low rate, Commonwealth Treasury Architecture of Australia’s Tax and Transfer (2008). This will cause fewer changes in the consumption and production decisions by the impact of tax on the prices of goods and services. Thus, additional indirect taxes such as the WET and the associated WET rebate impede efficiency. While, others argue that wine taxes are justified to address significant externality costs, Collins and Lapsley (2008). The WET, though, is based on a wholesale value (rather than the consumption of alcohol), and thus clearly fails to target the external costs associated with wine consumption. Overall, the case for a WET economic ground appears very weak.

In particular, the WET rebate subsidizes inefficient producers and thus hinders the industry from restructuring to clear the oversupply problems, Pernod Ricard (2015). It encourages an oversupply of low-value wine that is damaging the export market and damages the profitability of the industry, Pernod Ricard (2015) and Treasury Wine (2015). It also provides a competitive advantage to the New Zealand wine industry that can access the rebate. New Zealand wine producers are not subject to the same tax compliance checks as Australian businesses but are able to claim the rebate, and do not lodge an Australian income tax return or Business Activity Statement (BAS) statement. The rebate was designed to help small producers but as Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education (2015) points out it has not worked very effectively since 24 wine companies account for 90% of the wine production.

Reducing the WET rebate and tightening eligibility will improve economic efficiency since this will reduce the extent of the distortion. While Fogarty and Jakeman (2011) find this will have a negative effect on small wineries and regional tourism, this will be offset by the proposed industry assistance.

5.3. Equity

The WET is regressive, although, equity is not appear to be of prime importance given the presence of Australia’s progressive income tax rates and social security benefits. As noted above, though, there are serious equity problems with the WET rebate which has been subject to rorting. Tightening eligibility for the rebate to prevent such tax avoidance will improve equity.

5.4. Simplicity

Barton and Pinto note the high complexity of the WET and WET rebate which is evident from the legislation and from the number of ATO publications. There are 3 ATO rulings; 8 fact sheets; 2 forms; 3 how to complete your BAS; and 8 New Zealand WET rebate papers. Many of these publications are highly technical and lengthy. The WET ruling WET ruling 2004/1, “The operation of the WET system” runs to some 146 paragraphs. WET provides a complex second regime for alcohol taxation that sits uneasily with the excise system that applies to beer and spirits. The WET compliance costs are very regressive for the thousands of small wine producers that need to claim the WET rebate. Reducing the WET rebate will not aid simplicity, although tightening eligibility would appear to reduce the number of rebate applications and taxpayers’ involved and thus may marginally improve simplicity.

6. Conclusion

First, there is a lack of a policy justification for the WET. The WET system only marginally aids tax revenue collection. The WET creates economic distortions that damage the competitiveness of the wine industry. The main competitor wine producing countries Italy and France do not have to face such substantial taxes nor does New Zealand. The WET is regressive, although, equity is not appear to be of prime importance given the presence of progressive income tax rates and social security

26 WETA 1999.
benefits. The WET clearly fails the simplicity criteria. In particular, the WET should be repealed since it encourages the production of non-premium wine when the world is moving to the consumption of premium varieties.

Second, it is submitted that the WET rebate should be repealed. While the WET rebate meets its policy intent by allowing a majority of wine producers to fully offset their WET liability by accessing the WET rebate, and thus help small wine producers in rural and regional Australia this comes at a high price. The WET rebate damages fiscal adequacy, creates economic distortions, adds to complexity and the WET rebate rorting is inequitable. Although, before removing the rebate, research into value of the additional consumer surplus generated by additional wine consumption choices and the value of tourism and economic impact on regional economies should be assessed. To the extent that industry assistance is found necessary a direct grant could replace the rebate.

Overall, the mild 2016 Budget wine tax reforms and industry assistance are a step in the right direction but do not go far enough. Such reforms on the eve of the 2016 election campaign illustrate the highly political nature of Australian tax reform.

7. Theoretical and Practitioner Implications

Reducing the value of the impact of the WET rebate though will have a slightly negative economic impact to some wine regions, by decreasing the consumer surpluses generated by additional wine consumption choices and affecting the value of tourism. Providing the proposed assistance will help the industry to adjust to this reform.

Major tax reform is difficult. More research is needed into these supply and demand factors of tax reform to facilitate meaningful and lasting tax reform.

8. Limitations

Limitations of this study are acknowledged since policy settings are also the result of other factors such as political, social, cultural, and historical, which are beyond the scope of this paper.

References


